Bynner v. The Queen, Court of Queen's Bench, in the Exchequer Chamber, 1846

Source: The Law Journal Reports for the Year 1846, Volume 15, Part II, page 414

---

[IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER]
1846. Feb 2; June 13.
BYNNER v. THE QUEEN.

Patent, Scire Facias to repeal—Judgment; where to be signed—Queen's Bench—Chancery.

The record of a judgment on a scire facias to repeal letters patent for an invention, stated that the Lord Chancellor had delivered into the Court of Queen's Bench “a record had before the Queen in her Chancery in these words,” setting out the original writ of scire facias issuing out of Chancery and returnable there, which called on B, the patentee, to shew why the letters patent therein set forth, and the inrolment thereof, should not be cancelled, vacated, and disallowed, and the letters patent restored into Chancery, there to be cancelled. It then set out the pleas in bar, the issues in fact joined thereon, and the proceeding to trial, and the postea returned into the Queen's Bench. It then concluded with final judgment given by the Queen's Bench “that the said letters patent be cancelled, vacated, disallowed, annulled, made void and invalid, and be altogether had and held for nothing, and also that the enrolment thereof be cancelled, and that the said letters patent be restored into her said Majesty's Court of Chancery at Westminster aforesaid, there to be cancelled. And the tenor of the said record so delivered by the said Lord High Chancellor into the said court of our said Lady the Queen before the Queen herself, and of all things had thereupon in the same court, is remanded into the said Chancery of our said Lady the Queen.”

Held, upon writ of error, that the Court of Queen's Bench had power to give such judgment.

Error from the Court of Queen's Bench, upon a judgment of that court on a scire facias to repeal letters patent.

The record was, in so far as is material to the present question, as follows:—Placitum of Hilary term, 5 Vict.: amongst the pleas of the Queen, Roll 2. England to wit.—Be it remembered, that the Right. Hon. John Singleton Baron Lyndhurst, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, on the 15th day of April, in this same term, before our sovereign Lady the Queen, at Westminster, hath delivered here into court, with his own proper hand, a record laid before our said Lady the Queen, in her Chancery, in these words:—The writ of scire facias was then set out, which recited certain letters patent, granted to Jeremiah Bynner, for certain improvements in the manufacture of lamps, containing the usual proviso for making them void, in case the said grant was contrary to law, or prejudicial, or inconvenient in general, or the said invention was not new; this recital concluded—as by the said letters patent, inrolled in our said Court of Chancery, amongst other things, will more fully and at large appear.” The scire facias then set out several counts or issues “by means of which said several premises the said letters patent, so as aforesaid granted to the said J. B., are and ought to be void and of no effect in law.” The writ then called upon the said J. B. “that he be before us in our Chancery on the 15th day of April, wheresoever it shall then be, to shew cause if he hath or knoweth of anything to say for himself why the said letters patent, so granted to him as aforesaid, and the inrolment of the same, for the reasons aforesaid, ought not to be cancelled, vacated, and disallowed, and those letters patent restored into our said Chancery, there to be cancelled, and further to do and receive those things which our said Chancery shall consider in this behalf.” The record then set forth the return of the sheriff to the writ of non est inventus. “And the said J. B., being solemnly demanded by, &c., his attorney comes; whereupon Sir F. Pollock, knight, Attorney General for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf, being present here in court in his proper person, prays that the said letters patent, so granted to the said J. B. as aforesaid, and the inrolment of the same, may be cancelled, vacated, and disallowed, and the said letters patent restored into her said Majesty's Chancery, there to be cancelled. And the said J. B. says &c. (setting out several pleas, concluding the country, whereupon issues are joined). Therefore, to try the several issues above joined, the sheriff is commanded that he cause to come before our said Lady the Queen on, &c., wheresoever she shall be in England, twelve, &c. (setting out the venire), at which time, to wit, on \&c., before our said Lady the Queen at Westminster, come, &c. (setting out the distringasjuratores), at which time, to wit, on, &c. (setting out he postea), “whereupon all and singular the premises being seen and fully understood by the court of our said Lady the Queen, before the Queen herself, how here, and mature deliberation being thereupon had, it is considered by the same Court here, that the said letters patent of our said Lady the Queen, so granted to the said J. B. as aforesaid, be revoked, cancelled, vacated, disallowed, annulled, void and invalid, and be altogether had and held for nothing; and also that the inrolment thereof be cancelled, quashed, and annulled, and that the said letters patent be restored into her said Majesty's Court of Chancery at Westminster aforesaid, there to be cancelled. And the tenor of the said record, so delivered by the Lord High Chancellor into the said court of our said Lady the Queen, before the Queen herself, and of all things had thereupon in the same court of our said Lady the Queen, before the queen herself, is remanded into the said Chancery of our said Lady the Queen.”

A writ of error was brought on the above judgment, upon which several errors were assigned, which were in substance, that the Court of Queen's Bench ought not to have given judgment upon this record, that the letters patent and inrolment should be cancelled; but that the record ought to have been returned and remanded into the Court of Chancery, that judgment might there be given upon the record, which Court alone had authority to pronounce the judgment. Joinder in error.

It was (Feb. 2, 1846) argued by—

Webster, for the plaintiff in error.—This writ of error is brought for the purpose of settling a doubt which exists between the crown office and the petty bag office, as to the right practice in signing final judgment on a scire facias to repeal letters patent. There have occurred by three cases where such a judgment has been signed upon letters patent for inventions. The Queen v. Nickells (1) is the first in order of date. There a bill of exceptions was tendered to the ruling of the Judge. Judgment was signed in the petty bag office in Easter term 1842, to cancel the letters patent, and a writ of error sued out to the House of Lords by special original out of the petty bag office, but the case was afterwards compromised. The present is the second instance, and here judgment was signed in the crown office on the authority of Jefreson v. Morton (2). The Queen v. Newton (3) is the last, and in that alone the proceedings were complete. There the Crown had a verdict, and final judgment was afterwards signed in the petty bag office; and on a motion to the Lord Chancellor, he, assisted by the Master of the Rolls, cancelled the letters patent. The judgment of the Queen's Bench in the present case is, that the letters patent be revoked, void and invalid, and be altogether had and held for nothing, and that the inrolment thereof be cancelled, quashed, and annulled, and that the said letters patent be restored into her Majesty's Court of Chancery, there to be cancelled, and then the record is remanded into Chancery. There may be some cases where the Queen's Bench might give such a judgment to revoke a grant by the Crown, but that is where the whole record is removed into the Queen's Bench; but here part of the record remained in the Chancery. It is suggested that The Queen v. Newton is distinguishable, inasmuch as it is there called a “transcript” of a record, whereas here the “record itself” is said to be sent; but the Court of Queen's Bench has decided that the invariable practice is to call it a “record” (4). It is submitted that the present judgment is erroneous, and that the correct course is to send the record back to Chancery, in order that judgment may be there given. Jeffreson v. Morton, on which the present case rests, proves too much; as it is clear that something still remains to be done in Chancery, for by the judgment itself the letters patent are to be remanded into the Chancery to be cancelled there. The Queen's Bench have no power to cancel the Queen's grant: that appertains solely to the Lord Chancellor virtute officii, who may, notwithstanding this judgment, refuse to cancel the letters. At common law the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that the patent was void for want of novelty, was final; but by 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 83. s. 11. the patentee may now cure a defect in his specification by disclaimer, and the patent would not then be wholly void; this may be done after judgment is given on the sci. fa.; and it would be an injustice if, in such cases, the Queen's Bench could repeal the patent, which, after all, the Lord Chancellor might refuse to carry into full effect. The former practice was to memorialize the Crown before issuing the sci. fa.—2 Richardson, C. P. Pract. p. 391, 398, 1 Wms. Saund. Rep. p. 72, u, x. This is now altered, and the sci. fa. issued on a fiat of the Attorney General, and a bond being given for the costs, which remains in the petty bag office. Jeffreson v. Morton was a sci. fa. on a recognizance in Chancery, and there being issues of law and of fact raised in the record, the whole record was delivered by the Chancellor into the King's Bench for the purpose of trying the issues in fact; and it was held, that judgment must be there given, and that the record should not be remanded to Chancery. That case is perfectly true wherever the whole record goes to the Queen's Bench, as it did there, and where the adjournment of the cause adjourns everything, and gives all the jurisdiction to that court. But it is inapplicable if there is any part of the proceedings which the Queen's Bench are not competent to do. The Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry's case, there cited (p. 27), appears to be wrongly quoted. On reference to the Year Book, 24 Edw. 3. 73, b. pl. 91. the sci. fa. was not brought “on a recognizance which was sent into the court;” “record of nonsuit” seems to be a mistake for “recognizance.” Per Bassett, “The record of the recognizance and of the plea is remander here as entirely as it was there:” that case therefore falls within the same distinction.

[MAULE J.—There is no mistake. The sci. fa. was brought in the King's Bench on the record there, which began with the recognizance out of Chancery; the counsel who used it in argument, in Jeffreson v. Morton, supposed that it did not. “Record of nonsuit” must mean the record in which the nonsuit was.]

In Digge's case (5) the Court of Queen's Bench had power to carry out the whole of the judgment which they pronounced. As to the adjournment of the cause, he referred to 6 Vin. Abr. ‘Court of King's Bench,’ (G) p. 5, Bro. Abr. ‘Record,’ pl. 79, ‘Conusance,’ pl. 61, Keilway 98, a, as exceptions to the rule in Jeffreson v. Morton, that a record once in the King's Bench must always remain there.

[TINDAL, C.J.—You admit the rule to be strictly true, if you understand by the record the whole record.]

And adding the condition that the Queen's Bench have entire jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the judgment. In a traverse on an inquisition de lunatico inquirendo, sent to the Queen's Bench, the record goes back to the Chancery. He cited also 4 Inst. 80, Sackvile College case (6), 1 Roll. Abridg. tit. ‘Courts,’ 1, G, ‘Bank le Roy,’ Jenkins, 3 Cent. 133, pl. 71, Mark Steward's case (7), Sarnfield's case, cited in Prince's case (8). The Mayor and Burgesses of Liverpool v. the Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster, B. R. Trin. 12 Ann. (9). shews that the jurisdiction to cancel pleas flows from the custody of the Great Seal, and the practice has been always to deal with such cases in Chancery. Hunt v. Coffin (10). Bro. Abr. tit. ‘Bar,’ fol. 45. In 4 Inst. 88. it is said that the Chancellor, by his ordinary power, may hold plea of scire facias, to repeal the King's letters patents, under the Great Seal, being always inrolled in this court. And Lord Coke states the judgment to be “quod prædictæ literæ patentes dicti domini regis revocentur, concellentur, evacuentur, adnullentur, et vacuæ et invalidæ, pro nullo penitus habeantur et teneantur; ac etiam quo irrotulamentum eorundem cancelletur, cassetur et adnihiletur:” that is the precise form of the present judgment. The authority in 4 Inst. 72 that a sci. fa. to repeal a patent may be in the King's Bench, is founded on 3 Hen. 4. c. 29. erroneously cited 3 Hen. 4. c. 7. It is also cited as 3 Hen. 4. 6. in Bro. Abr. tit. ‘Brief,’ pl. 104, with a quære, and only decides that there may be several writs of scire facias issued. Bro. Abr. tit. ‘Petition,’ pl. 11, citing 21 Edw. 3. fol. 47, seems to be the key to all the cases. There it is said that the right to repeal a patent is only in the Chancery; and the principle is established in The King v. Butler (11). Brewster v. Weld (12) was a writ returnable in the Queen's Bench, not, as here, in Chancery. The object of the writ is to get the inrolment cancelled—Lilley's Entries, p. 419. The power delegated to the Queen's Bench is to do what the Court of Chancery cannot do, viz., to try the issues. the judgment is also erroneous, as it omits to notice that the seventh issue was found for the defendant.

Hugh Hill, for the Crown.—It is admitted that judgment might be given in Chancery; all that is contended for is, that, under the circumstances, the Queen's Bench may do so also. Both courts are one, coram rege—Gilbert's Hist. and Practice of Chancery, p. 12, 3 Black. Comm. p. 48, Tidd's Pract. 9th edit. p. 1095, citing Blaxton's case (13), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 128, Anon. 21 Hen. 7. fol. 35, Bro. Abr. ‘Judgment,’ pl. 135, Staunforth, ‘Prerogative,’ 77, b.. Where issues in law are joined, or the defendant does not appear, the Court in Chancery gives judgment; but where there are issues of fact, it may be given by the Queen's Bench. In the report of Jefferson v. Dawson (14), where issues in law and of fact were raised, the difficulty was urged that there would be two judgments, if the whole record were sent, it being assumed that the Queen's Bench was to give judgment on the issues of fact.—He cited The Queen v. Aires (15), The King v. Holland (16), Fitzh. Abr. ‘Petition,’ last pl. citing 13 Hen. 3. fol. 59, b, cited in Magdalen College case (17). This is a strong case to shew that a charter may be repealed in the King's Bench. the Court of Queen's Bench have decided that whenever issues are joind in fact, on a sci. fa. to repeal letters patent, the record delivered into the Queen's Bench is one on which the Court has power to give judgment, although the record in Chancery may be the original record, and that in the Queen's Bench may be called a transcript. The record, mentioned in Jenkins, 3 Cent. case 74, cited on the other side, is the record of the patent. There are many precedents of judgment given in the Court of Queen's Bench to repeal letters patent and charters, the records of which are still remaining in the Queen's Bench: one has been found in the Tower (18). a scire facias, by the abbot of Cirencester, to repeal a charter, and judgment was given by the Queen's Bench, “quod charta prædicta adnulletur,” &c.; attached is a certiorari, which issued out of Chancery, to the Queen's Bench. What Lord Hale says, in the Sackvile College case, is merely an obiter dictum, no judgment being given, and the real point was one in no way bearing on the present case. In Arkwright's Case (19) it is stated that the Court of Queen's Bench gave judgment to cancel the patent. There are cases in the Year Books, in which a sci. fa. issued in Chancery, returnable into the Queen's Bench, Mic. 11. Hen. 4. fol. 5 (a market case), Trin. 21 Hen. 3. fol. 58, b, where a form is given of sci. fa. out of Chancery, returnable into the Queen's Bench. In Mich. 3 & 4 Phil & M.roll 116, judgment was given by the Queen's Bench, and now remaining inrolled, “Quod literæ patentes revocentur, adnullentur et evacuentur,” &c. He also cited Rast. Entries, 461, Anon. 748, Mark Steward's case, Digges's case, where a special verdict was found and judgment given in the Queen's Bench; also Molineux v. Lacon (20), and The Queen v. Mason (21), as cases in which judgment was given in the Queen's Bench. The cases cited on the other side as mentioned in the margin of Dacre's case (22), to shew that the record must be remanded to Chancery, and judgment given there, cannot be found in the Year Books; and no authority is cited for ther latter part of the dictum from the 4th Inst. 80. The case of the Mayor and Burgesses of Liverpool v. the Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster, only shews where the sci. fa. must issue from; and the same observation applies to the case from Bro. Abr. tit. ‘Petition,’ pl. 104; Brewster v. Weld is rather an authority in favour of this judgment. It is not necessary to consider whether a patentee can enter a disclaimer after judgment on a sci. fa.. But the true construction of the act, 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 83, is, that any time before the sci. fa. is actually tried, the patentee may obtain leave of the Attorney or Solicitor General to enter a disclaimer as to part: and such entry shall be available after issue joined; but not on the trial of an action for an infringement commenced by the patentee before he disclaimed. Then, as to the argument, that one of the issues was found for the defendant, and that no notice of this is taken in the judgment; that is of no consequence, for no judgment is given for costs in the Queen's Bench. The remedy for costs is on the bond which is in the hands of one of the Masters of the petty bag office—Underhill v. Devereux (23). Then it is objected, that the Court of Queen's Bench had, at all events, no power to order that the inrolment of the letters patent should be cancelled. If that should be so held, then this Court will on that point give such a judgment as should have been given in the Court below; but it is submitted that the judgment is not beyond the power of the Court, for if it has power to give judgment at all, it must have power to give a complete one.

Webster, in reply.—The last part of the argument admits that the Queen's Bench cannot execute this judgment, and it was never denied that that Court had power to give some judgments. The argument on this sid as to the last point is, that the judgment on all the six issues is on such defects as could be cured by disclaimer under Lord Brougham's Act; for, if the patentee could disclaim after verdict on the action, he never ought to be defeated by this sort of proceeding.

[TINDAL, C.J.—You would, I suppose, wish, then, that the Court should suspend their judgment, if the defects are such as may be cured by disclaimer.]

All the cases cited on the other side, of writs out of Chancery returnable into the Queen's Bench, are different from the present. The cases from Rastell's Entries, Mark Steward's case and Digges's case, were all cases on inquisitions. In Sarnfield's case judgment was by default; and the prayer of the petition was, that the letters patent be cancelled; but the judgment stopped short of that.

[TINDAL, C.J.—The cases of fines bear upon it, where judgment is that a fine be cancelled.]

A sci. fa. must issue upon a record; and all the cases referred to of removal by certiorari are such cases. The case from Keilway is one of the same class. Arkwright's case is no authority either way, for it is not known what was the form of the judgment. The case of The Carmelite Friars, cited in the Magdelen College case, goes merely to shew that the mode of getting in the letters patent. Unless the whole record is adjourned the record must be remanded, otherwise each Court might give different judgments—The King v. Holland (24), per Rolle, C.J. In the case referred to from the Tower, the whole record is brought into the King's Bench by certiorari.

[MAULE, J.—If the judgment is wrong as to ordering the cancelling of the patent, is it to be reversed any further than as to the cancelling?]

If bad at all, it must be bad altogether; it is a judgment of a different kind from that which the Court of Queen's Bench can give; and the whole matter comes to this—the record is in Chancery; this is only a transcript sent from Chancery, on which no judgment can be given. The Court should have entered the verdict on the postea and sent it back. And, in all cases cited on the other side, there was either a sci. fa. returnable into the Queen's Bench, or something equivalent to an entire adjournment of the case.

Cur. adv. vult.

The judgment of the Court (25) was now (June 13) delivered by—

TINDAL, C.J.—This was a scire facias, brought to repeal certain letters patent, which had been granted to the plaintiff in error. The record before us, which is brought by writ of error from the Court of Queen's Bench, states, that the Lord Chancellor “had delivered here into court, with his own proper hands, a record had before our Lady the Queen, in her Chancery, in these words”—The record so brought into the Court of Queen's Bench contains the recital of the original writ of scire facias, issuing out of the Court of Chancery and returnable there, calling on Bynner, the plaintiff in error, to appear and shew “why the letters patent, therein set forth, and the inrolment of the same, for the reasons therein given, ought not to be cancelled, vacated, and disallowed, and those letters patent to be restored into her Majesty's Chancery, there to be cancelled;” and the record proceeds to state, also, the grounds upon which the validity of the letters patent is impeached, the appearance and pleas in bar of Bynner, and the issues in fact joined thereon, and the award of the writ of venire facias returnable in the Court of Queen's Bench, the appearance there of the Attorney General on the part of the Crown, and of Bynner by his clerk in court, and the return of the venire facias, the award of the distringas, with the usual clause of Nisi Prius, and the postea returned by Mr. Justice Coleridge, who tried the issues; and then follows the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in these words:—“That the said letters patent be cancelled, vacated, disallowed, annulled, made void and invalid, and be altogether had and held for nothing, and also that the inrolment thereof be cancelled, and that the said letters patent be restored into her said Majesty's Court of Chancery, at Westminster aforesaid, there to be cancelled.” And the record now before us concludes with these words, viz.—“And the tenor of the said record, so delivered by the said Lord Chancellor into the said court of our said Lady the Queen before the Queen herself, and of all things had thereupon, in the said court of Our Lady the Queen, before the Queen herself, is remanded into the said Chancery of our said Lady the Queen.” And the question raised before us upon this writ of error has been, whether the Court of Queen's Bench has the power of giving the judgment before stated. On the part of the plaintiff in error it has been contended, that no more than a transcript of the record is sent down to the Queen's Bench, for the purpose of enabling that Court to try the issues which have been raised in the Court of Chancery, and that after the trial of such issues, the record so sent to that court should be returned with the postea to the Court of Chancery, to enable that Court to give effect to the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, so as to make the actual cancelling of the inrolment of the letters patent the act of the Court of Chancery, as being an act which that Court alone can carry into effect. On the part of the defendant in error it has been contended, on the other hand, that the record in the action of scire facias being sent to the Court of Queen's Bench, it is the duty of that Court to pronounce the judgment, and that the tenor, that is, an exact transcript of the whole record, is then transmitted to the Court of Chancery, to enable that Court to carry the judgment into effect by cancelling the inrolment there. There are difficulties, undoubtedly, in the establishing of either of these positions with absolute certainty, and there are conflicting authorities which have been brought forward in favour of both. On the whole, however, we think the balance of the authorities is decidedly in support of the position contended for on the part of the Crown, viz., that the record is sent down to the Queen's Bench, that the Queen's Bench has authority to award the judgment, and afterwards to transmit either the record or the tenor thereof to the Court of Chancery, in order to be fully carried into execution. In the first place, the proceedings before us state, that the Chancellor “has delivered here into court, with his own proper hands, a record.” And this is not the form in this instance only, but the general form in other precedents“(see Trem. Pleas of the Crown p. 652—The King v. Stone. See also Jefferson v. Morton.) In this latter case, the great question between the parties was, whether the record itself had been properly sent down from the Court of Chancery to the King's Bench, inasmuch as upon the record there was an issue in fact and also a demurrer in law, both joined in the Court of Chancery upon the same record. And no one appears to have doubted, in that case, that where there is an issue in fact only, the record must be sent down to the Court of King's Bench, as well for the purpose of trying the issue, as also of giving jugment thereon; but the point raised by the defendant's counsel was, that where an issue in fact is joined as to part, and a demurrer to another part of the record in Chancery, and the same is transmitted to the King's Bench to be tried, after the trial of the same the record ought to be sent back into Chancery, for the Chancellor or Keeper to give judgment upon it. But the whole Court delivered their opinions seriatim, that the record of the demurrer and issue together was well and legally transmitted, and the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal was also of the same opinion. And, in the course of the argument, Digges's case and Steward's case were relied upon, where the record was transmitted into B. R., and several special verdicts found, and the Court of King's Bench retained the records, and did not send them back into Chancery, but gave judgment on the special verdicts. It was objected, that although this might be the practice where a final judgment might be given, and execution had thereon in the Court of King's Bench, yet that in this case more remained to be done in the Court of Chancery, and which could not be done elsewhere, namely, that the letters patent and the inrolment thereof, which still remained in the Court of Chancery, are directed to be cancelled. But it seems a sufficient answer to this objection, that nothing remains to be done in the Court of Chancery but a mere ministerial act by the officers of that court; and it is clear, there is no difficulty in getting an exact transcript of the record of the judgment from the Court of King's Bench to the Court of Chancery, by certiorari and mittimus. The point, however, and the only point, to be determined by us, is, whether the Court of Queen's Bench had authority to give judgment in the case in the form in which they have given it; and we think they had. Many precedents have been found of judgments given in the Court of Queen's Bench to repeal letters patent, which records are still remaining in the King's Bench. In Michaelmas term, 3 & 4 Phil. & Mar. roll 16. is a record of scire facias to repeal letters patent, returnable in the King's Bench. The judgment entered therein in that court is—“Quod literæ patentes revocentur, adnullentur et evacuentur, et quod officium in manus domini regis seiziatur.” The case brought forward in the course of the argument, the record found in the Tower, Gloucester, No. 47 5 Hen. 5, is strong to the same point. A scire facias, brought by the abbot of Cirencester against the town of Cirencester, to repeal a charter to that town, and judgment given by the King's Bench—“Quod charta prædicta adnulletur, et penitus pro nihilo habeatur;” and in that case the tenor of the judgment alone is certified by the Court of King's Bench to the Court of Chancery, a certiorari having issued, and the return beginning with “tenor cujusdam recordi,” &c.: and we are informed through an officer of the Tower, that both in the Cirencester case, and in numerous other cases, a writ of certiorari is tied or pinned to the record of the Court of King's Bench, at the head of it, with this indorsement of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, “Executio istius brevis, &c” Without enumerating or referring to other authorities, cited in the course of the argument, we think these are abundantly sufficient to prove that the Court of Queen's Bench has the power of giving the judgment which they have given, and that the same must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

---

(1) Not reported.

(2) 2 Saund. 23.

(3) Not reported.

(4) In Midsummer vacation last, Webster moved to amend the record of the writ of error by stating that a transcript had been delivered by the Lord Chancellor into the Queen's Bench, but the Court of Exchequer Chamber refused to interfere, as the record was good on its face, and suggested an application to the Court of Queen's Bench, who, however, declined to make the amendment, as stated in the text.

(5) 1 Rep. 157, a.

(6) Sir T. Raym. 177.

(7) Cited in 9 Rep. 99, a.

(8) 8 Ibid. 23, a.

(9) Cited 1 Str. 151.a.

(10) Dyer, 197.b.

(11) 3 Lev. 220.

(12) 6 Mod. 229.

(13) Latch. 3.

(14) 1 Mod. 29.

(15) 10 Mod. 258.

(16) 1 Roll. Abr. ‘Courts,’ G, pl. 3; s.c. Aleyn, 14. Styles. 84, 90.

(17) 11 Rep. 74, a.

(18) Gloucester, No. 47, 5 Hen. 5

(19) Webst. Pat. Ca. 56, 74

(20) Cro. Jac. 12

(21) 2 Salk. 447.

(22) 22 Edw. 3. fol. 5. cited 1 Roll. Abr. ‘Courts,' G. pl. 1.

(23) 2 Wms. Saund. 72, c, n.

(24) Styles, 95.

(25) Tindal, C.J., Pollock, C.B., Parke, B., Rolfe, B. Maule, J., Cresswell, J., and Erle, J.